

20

Abstract

21 This paper examines relations between billions of dollars donated from foreign entities to U.S.
22 colleges and universities over the past decade and political developments on those campuses. We
23 conducted seven studies investigating the associations between this foreign funding and aspects of the
24 campus liberal democratic climate. Specifically, we explored links between different funding sources
25 and the deterioration of free speech and academic freedom, and the presence of antisemitism. Study
26 One reports that 349 colleges and universities received a combined total of almost \$18 billion from
27 foreign sources between 2014 and 2019. Study Two examined relationships of foreign funding to two
28 speech outcomes: campus deplatforming of speakers and punitive actions taken against scholars for
29 speech protected by academic freedom. Its main results were that: 1. overall foreign funding was not
30 strongly related to campus speech outcomes; 2. but higher levels of deplatforming and speech
31 punishment occurred on campuses that received funding from member states of the international
32 Organisation' of Islamic Cooperation and from authoritarian countries. Study Three found consistent
33 but weak evidence that foreign funding was associated with college students' reported exposure to
34 antisemitic and anti-Zionist tropes. After demonstrating substantial correlations among three national
35 measures of antisemitic incidents (Study Four), Study Five found that foreign funding, especially
36 when provided either by member countries of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation or by
37 authoritarian countries, was associated with elevated levels of campus antisemitism and anti-Zionist
38 incidents. Studies Six and Seven employed spatial modeling, finding that antisemitic incidents on
39 campus are associated with and forecast local antisemitic incidents across the country.

40 **1 Introduction: Widespread Failure to Report Donations from Foreign Sources**

41 American institutions of higher education receive billions of dollars in foreign funding each year.
42 Much of this funding has not, historically, been reported to the U.S. Department of Education as
43 required by law. In this paper, we present seven studies addressing a range of issues related to this
44 funding. Study One describes the methods and results of the investigative accounting used to uncover
45 the extent of unreported foreign funding. Studies Two through Six address the relationship of this
46 funding to campus liberal democratic practices regarding free speech, academic freedom, and
47 antisemitism.

48 In July 2019, Small & Bass (2019) presented to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) the results of
49 investigative research into the foreign funding of American colleges and universities. This
50 presentation detailed extensive funding by foreign governments, foundations, and corporations, all of
51 which adhere to and promote authoritarian and antisemitic ideologies. Specifically, Small & Bass
52 (2019) reported uncovering billions of dollars coming from Qatar to U.S. colleges and universities
53 that had not previously been reported to the U.S. Department of Education (DoEd) as required by
54 law.

55 This reporting anomaly captured the attention of lawmakers. An investigation was conducted by the
56 U.S. federal government, including numerous presentations and testimonies involving U.S. officials
57 from the DoEd (Camera, 2020a; Dennett, 2019). The DoEd investigation discovered \$6.5 billion in
58 previously unreported foreign funding (U.S. Department of Education, 2020). Updated DoEd
59 reporting found that significant amounts of funding originated from Middle Eastern countries and
60 authoritarian regimes hostile to fundamental principles of democracy and human rights (Small &
61 Bass, 2020). The studies presented here examined the relationship between the foreign funding
62 reported thus far and both democratic norms and antisemitism in U.S. institutions of higher
63 education.

64 Given the historical lack of transparency in reporting the receipt of foreign funding on the part of
65 institutions of higher education, it is possible that additional such funding will be disclosed in the
66 future. But throughout this paper, we use the term “Section 117 funding” to refer to funds that were,
67 as of September 2020, disclosed as having been received between 2014 and 2019 in accordance with
68 this requirement:

69 Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) requires institutions of higher
70 education that receive federal financial assistance to disclose semiannually to the U.S.
71 Department of Education any gifts received from and contracts with a foreign source that,
72 alone or combined, are valued at \$250,000 or more in a calendar year. The statute also
73 requires institutions to report information when owned or controlled by a foreign source.
74 (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.).

75 **2 Funding, Authoritarianism, Liberal Democratic Norms and Antisemitism**

76 American institutions of higher education have many goals, including the production of new
77 knowledge through scholarship. Knowledge-production is built on a foundation of liberal democratic
78 norms, including free speech, academic freedom, and free inquiry—sometimes referred to as *the open*
79 *society* (Popper, 1945/2020). Many have argued that these norms comprise a critical foundation for

80 both scientific discovery and addressing controversial social issues (e.g., Mill, 1859; Rauch, 1993;
81 University of Chicago, 2014). These values are antithetical to authoritarianism whether of the
82 political right (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Yourman, 1939) or left (e.g., Costello et al., 2022; Dikötter,
83 2016). Whether Section 117 funding, especially from authoritarian regimes, is involved in the erosion
84 of support for the open society on U.S. college and university campuses is an open question.
85 Accordingly, one of the central purposes of the present research is to address this question.

86 While prior generations of authoritarian governments relied more strictly on overt punishment and
87 censorship, modern authoritarianism often relies on strategies that appear less obtrusive.
88 “Informational autocracy” refers to the use of political power to control the flow of information in
89 such a manner as to maintain false impressions of competence, honesty, and effectiveness of those in
90 power, and to censor, demonize, or delegitimize elites or the public who oppose them (Guriev &
91 Treisman, 2020). If successful, this form of soft authoritarianism maintains popular support, can
92 remain in power for long periods, and, eventually, undermines democracy (Krekó, 2022). A facade of
93 democratic elections can be maintained by enlisting observers of dubious credibility from supporting
94 outside regimes, as has been done in Hungary (Krekó, 2022).

95 Another manifestation of soft authoritarianism that also involves information control and
96 manipulation has been referred to as “networked authoritarianism.” Internationally, networked
97 authoritarianism functions to advance goals analogous to information autocracy with one crucial
98 difference: the goal is to advance regime interests abroad by strengthening its foreign supporters and
99 weakening its foreign opponents. This can be done by providing rhetorical support through
100 information networks (such as social media, including the use of bots programmed to disseminate
101 disinformation and sow division among regime opponents) and/or by providing financial support to
102 those in other countries who are aligned with regime interests (Kalathil, 2020; Maréchal, 2017).

103 Authoritarianism, both at the individual psychological level and among government actors, is often
104 associated with antisemitism (Altemeyer, 1981). The most obvious recent historical cases are Nazi
105 Germany, the Soviet Union, and Islamist regimes. A growing body of literature addresses a possible
106 connection between funding from Islamic authoritarian regimes that hold anti-Israel views, and on-
107 campus antisemitism. Elman and Romirowsky (2019, p. 230) wrote:

108 In the United States over the last decades large sums of money from the United Arab
109 Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have been pumped into the humanities and social sciences
110 through chairs, grants, and fellowships, dictating what Middle East-related courses are taught
111 and the kinds of extracurricular programming that is offered. Strapped for funds and eager to
112 promote international and multicultural studies, many campuses have readily accepted this
113 support despite the implicitly anti-American agendas that they bring.

114 Unfortunately, much of the work on this subject (e.g., Cravatts, 2011; Fishman, 2012) is a strange
115 mix of empirical claims clouded by polemics and accusations. Criticism of universities for taking
116 donations from Middle Eastern, Islamic and authoritarian sources has become politicized and often
117 lacks evidentiary support. Nonetheless, a question that can and should be addressed empirically is
118 this: Is there a relationship between funding from authoritarian regimes and campus illiberalism and
119 antisemitism?

120 **2.2 Research Questions**

121 Although the present research was exploratory, there are good theoretical reasons to expect
122 relationships between Section 117 contributions and illiberal trends in American institutions of higher
123 education. We examined two potential aspects of campus life in which receipt of Section 117
124 contributions may be involved: 1. erosion of free speech and academic freedom, and 2. antisemitism.

125 How might this work within universities? First, Section 117 money may be used to facilitate an
126 intolerant intellectual environment on campus, one with higher levels of deplatforming, more calls for
127 punishing speech and expression, and endorsement of censorship. Second, the money might be used
128 to support and expand the work of faculty or students who are willing to violate others' speech rights.
129 Third, the money might be used to support antisemitic extremist groups on campus and/or groups
130 whose activities spill over into violation of others' speech rights. Fourth, it might buy a sort of soft
131 influence—the institutional administration or whoever is receiving the funds might become more
132 sympathetic to the interests and ideological agendas of the donor.

133 The flood of Section 117 funding described herein coincides with both increased illiberal, anti-
134 democratic sentiment on American college and university campuses (Rausch et al., 2023; Stevens,
135 2022, 2023) and antisemitic incidents (Beckwith & Rossman-Benjamin, 2022). The research reported
136 herein provides the first effort to quantitatively examine the potential relationship between Section
137 117 funds, anti-democratic trends, and levels of antisemitism on American college and university
138 campuses. Specifically, the present work investigates the following questions:

- 139 1. Is receipt of Section 117 funding per se, regardless of source, associated with
140 increased illiberal, anti-democratic behaviors involving campus censorship and
141 suppression of academic freedom?
- 142 2. Is receipt of Section 117 funding from member countries of the Organisation for
143 Islamic Cooperation and authoritarian regimes associated with more illiberal, anti-
144 democratic behaviors involving campus censorship and suppression of academic
145 freedom?
- 146 3. Is receipt of Section 117 funding per se, regardless of source, associated with higher
147 levels of antisemitic activity on those campuses?
- 148 4. Is receipt of Section 117 funding from member countries of the Organisation for
149 Islamic Cooperation and authoritarian regimes associated with more campus
150 antisemitic activity than contributions from other countries?
- 151 5. Is campus antisemitism associated with incidents of regional and national antisemitic
152 activity?

153 **3 Data and Methods Common Across Multiple Studies**

154 **3.1 Data Sources and Aggregation**

155 The data sources drawn upon include:

- 156 1. Investigative research from the DoEd by Michael Bass, CPA, for the Network
157 Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) on Section 117 funding to campuses (see Tables
158 S1 and S2). These data were based on funding uncovered as of September 23, 2020.
159 However, because much such data went reported and investigations are ongoing, it is
160 possible that additional previously-undisclosed foreign contributions may be
161 uncovered.
- 162 2. Information on antisemitic hate crimes in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI,
163 n.d.) Uniform Crime Reporting database.
- 164 3. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL, n.d.) Antisemitic Incident Tracker.
- 165 4. Antisemitic incident data from the AMCHA Initiative (n.d.-a).
- 166 5. Some analyses involve funding from other authoritarian sources. We operationalize
167 this as the top 30 most authoritarian countries in the world, plus Russia (see Table S4
168 for the list of authoritarian countries). This is based on The Economist Intelligence
169 Unit's (2017) Democracy Index. Even though authoritarianism is a matter of degree,
170 for simplicity of presentation, and because we dichotomized countries in this manner,
171 we refer to these as "authoritarian" countries and the others as "non-authoritarian"
172 countries.
- 173 6. Some analyses involve funding from member countries of the Organisation of Islamic
174 Cooperation (OIC, n.d.). The full list of countries appears in Table S3, as well as
175 which countries provided Section 117 funding. Most majority Muslim countries score
176 poorly on both the Democracy Index and on measures of anti-Zionism and
177 antisemitism (Tausch, 2014). The partial correlation (controlling for economic
178 development) of membership in the OIC and antisemitism was over 0.7. Although this
179 relationship disappeared in an analysis controlling for other indicators related to Islam
180 (Muslim proportion of population, membership in the Arab League, both of which
181 predicted antisemitism): a. The overall picture remains that of a heavily Islamic
182 country scoring high in antisemitism; b. Tausch's research involved different outcome
183 variables than the present research (Tausch studied antisemitism *within those*
184 *countries*, whereas our research examines both erosion of norms around academic
185 freedom and antisemitism in the U.S.); and c. most member countries in the OIC also
186 score low in the Democracy Index. By using membership in the OIC, the present
187 exploratory research intentionally casts a wide net.

188 For incidents of antisemitism on campus, in this report, we use the term "Expression" to refer to
189 AMCHA's recording of expressions of antisemitism that do not target particular students or Jewish
190 institutions, such as episodes of antisemitic graffiti, slogans, and chants. We use the term "Targeting"
191 to refer to AMCHA's reporting of incidents of antisemitism on campus that target specific students
192 (e.g., harassment) and institutions (e.g., defacing a Hillel). Some analyses also rely on AMCHA data
193 on activities involving the anti-Zionist Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement on
194 campus. The question of whether BDS activities are antisemitic is contentious. Resolving this
195 question is beyond the scope of the present paper. Therefore, we present anything involving BDS as
196 "antisemitic/anti-Zionist."

197 **4 Study 1: Section 117 Funding**

198 The main purpose of Study 1 was to determine the Section 117 funding that U.S. institutions of
199 higher learning received from foreign governments from 2014 to 2019. This timeframe is used
200 because it is the timeframe covered by the prior U.S. Department of Education investigations
201 (Camera, 2020a; Dennett, 2019).

202 **4.1 Methods**

203 From 1981 to 2020, the DoEd hosted a portal for foreign funding of American institutions of higher
204 education. This portal made publicly available the amount of foreign funding received by those
205 institutions as they reported it to the DoEd. From 2014-2019, Michael Bass downloaded the
206 information as it became available (twice per year) and consolidated the new reporting information
207 with all previous information. Starting in 2020, the DoEd changed the portal mechanism, so that it
208 now includes all information since 1981 (Department of Education, n.d.).

209 **4.2 Results and Discussion**

210 Between 2014 and 2019, 349 U.S. colleges and universities received Section 117 funding from 158
211 foreign countries. The total sum across all universities and years was \$17,961,986,172. Table 1A
212 shows the top 10 countries contributing this type of funding to U.S. institutions of higher education
213 during this time period. Table 1B shows the 10 universities that received the most Section 117
214 funding during this time period. Supplemental tables provide full data on all countries and
215 institutions. Table S1 reports how much Section 117 funding had been donated by each of the 158
216 countries to U.S. institutions of higher education. Table S2 lists the amounts of Section 117 funding
217 received by each of the 349 institutions of higher education during this time period. The values
218 obtained in Study 1 (see Table S2) are used in all subsequent studies assessing the relationship of
219 Section 117 funding to other outcomes.

220 **5 Study 2: Section 117 Funding and Anti-Democratic Activity on American College** 221 **Campuses**

222 The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) empirically assesses failures of colleges
223 and universities to support free speech and academic freedom in a variety of ways. One is by
224 maintaining a database of Scholars Under Fire (FIRE, n.d.-a). This tracks outcomes of campaigns to
225 sanction academics for speech that should be protected by either the First Amendment (for state
226 colleges and universities) or contractual commitments to academic freedom. Another, the Campus
227 Deplatforming database (FIRE, n.d.-b), tracks outcomes of deplatforming attempts to disinvite
228 speakers from campus, cancel performances (e.g., concerts, plays, screenings of movies), or have
229 controversial artwork removed from public display. These databases and their full methodologies are
230 publicly available on FIRE's website.

231 Research by FIRE indicates that attempts to sanction scholars and disinvite speakers have increased
232 sharply in recent years on college campuses (Lukianoff & Schlott, 2023). This suggests a decline in
233 support for liberal democratic norms among students and faculty (Honeycutt & Jussim, 2023; see also
234 Stevens & Haidt, 2018). Because attempts to sanction scholars or disinvite speakers can be
235 considered types of anti-democratic behavior, the present study examined whether these attempts
236 were associated with receipt of foreign funding. Accordingly, we merged FIRE's Scholars Under Fire
237 and Campus Deplatforming databases with our own database on Section 117 funds.

238 We examined the question of whether simply having received foreign funding was associated with
239 erosion of liberal democratic norms by comparing campuses that received foreign funding with those
240 that did not. We also investigated whether erosion of liberal democratic norms on campus was
241 associated specifically with having received funding from regimes hostile to democratic norms. We
242 examined this by comparing campuses that received funding from OIC member countries with those
243 that did not, and by comparing campuses that received foreign funding from authoritarian regimes
244 with those that did not. Accordingly, Study 2 examined six research questions:

245 **Research Question 1:** Is Receipt of Section 117 Funding Related to Erosion of Campus Liberal
246 Democratic Norms Around Speech?

247 1a. Do institutions that received foreign funding have more Scholars Under Fire than
248 institutions that did not receive foreign funding?

249 1b. Do institutions that received foreign funding have more deplatforming attempts than
250 institutions that did not receive foreign funding?

251 **Research Question 2:** Is Receipt of Section 117 Funding from OIC Member Countries Related to
252 Campus Erosion of Liberal Democratic Norms Around Speech?

253 2a. Do institutions that received foreign funding from OIC member countries have more
254 Scholars Under Fire than do institutions that received foreign funding from other countries?

255 2b. Do institutions that received foreign funding from OIC member countries have more
256 deplatforming attempts than do institutions that received foreign funding from other
257 countries?

258 **Research Question 3:** Is Receipt of Section 117 Funding from Authoritarian Regimes Related to
259 Campus Erosion of Liberal Democratic Norms Around Speech?

260 3a. Do institutions that received foreign funding from the most authoritarian countries,
261 compared to those that received funding from other countries, have more Scholars Under Fire
262 than do institutions that received foreign funding from other countries?

263 3b. Do institutions that received foreign funding from the most authoritarian regimes,
264 compared to those that received funding from other countries, have more deplatforming
265 attempts than do institutions that received foreign funding from other countries?

266 **5.1 Methods**

267 This study assessed relations between receipt of Section 117 funds and FIRE data on Scholars Under
268 Fire and campus deplatforming attempts (FIRE, n.d.-a,b) for 2014-2023. The relevant information
269 from FIRE databases that we included was as follows:

- 270 ● The school at which the scholar came under fire or the deplatforming attempt occurred.
- 271 ● The number of incidents reported at institutions listed by FIRE in both databases.

272 Table S3 provides the list of OIC member countries that provided Section 117 funding. Table S4
273 provides the list of authoritarian countries that provided Section 117 funding.

274 **5.2 Results and Discussion**

275 There were 986 Scholars Under Fire and 771 deplatforming attempts between 2014 and 2023
276 (summarized by year in Table 2).

277 **5.2.1 Main Analysis Overview**

278 Our first research question involved comparing institutions that received Section 117 funding to those
279 that did not. Our second and third research questions were restricted to institutions that received
280 funding from OIC member countries and authoritarian regimes, respectively. However, some OIC
281 member countries are also on the list of authoritarian countries. Because of these overlapping
282 categories, we could not use ANOVA in our analyses.

283 Regression techniques were deemed inappropriate because the same dollar figure did not necessarily
284 mean the same thing to different institutions. For example, a \$500,000 grant to a major university
285 with a \$1 billion yearly budget does not necessarily mean the same thing as a \$500,000 to a small
286 liberal arts college.

287 Countries were categorized into three pairs of two groups for three separate comparisons. The first
288 comparison assessed differences between institutions that did versus did not receive Section 117
289 funding; the second assessed differences between institutions that received Section 117 funding from
290 OIC vs. other countries; the third assessed differences between institutions that received Section 117
291 funding from authoritarian versus other countries.

292 We did not compare dollar amounts. In several ways, grouping institutions as we did rendered our
293 analyses more statistically conservative. First, our analyses ignored variability in the amount of
294 funding received among those that received any funding at all. Second, the hypotheses were tested
295 through a series of two group comparisons using Welch's t-tests. These are generally more
296 conservative than conventional t-tests and permit comparisons even when some of the assumptions
297 underlying the conventional t-test are not met (Delacre et al., 2017). Because our outcomes are count
298 variables, we considered using an alternative test statistic, such as the Mann Whitney U test, which is
299 a nonparametric analog to the t-test. However, with large samples such as ours, the Mann Whitney U
300 produces far more false positives (statistically significant differences when there are none in the
301 underlying population) than does the t-test, which has an error rate very close to alpha (e.g., 5% error
302 rate at $p \leq .05$; Fagerland, 2012). Therefore, rather than using the Mann Whitney U, we used the more
303 conservative Welch's t-test, which adjusts for unequal variances by reducing the degrees of freedom.

304 The third way we were conservative in analyzing the data was by using p-values of less than .01
305 rather than .05 as the threshold for considering differences as statistically credible. This is consistent
306 with research (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) finding that results with p-values below .01 were
307 much more likely to be replicable than those between .05 and .01.

308 **Research Question 1: Is Receipt of Section 117 Funding Related to Erosion of Campus Liberal 309 Democratic Norms Around Speech?**

310 Our first set of analyses compared speech norms among campuses that received Section 117 funding
311 with those that did not. These analyses provided weak and inconsistent evidence that institutions that
312 received foreign funding had experienced an erosion in liberal democratic norms around speech
313 (Table 3). There were more attempts to sanction scholars at institutions that received foreign funding

314 (mean=1.82) than those that did not (mean=1.38; Welch's $t(420.8)=2.44$, $p=.015$), but this falls short
315 of our .01 threshold for statistical significance and the effect size was small ($d=.15$). Similarly,
316 deplatforming attempts at institutions that did not receive foreign funding (mean=1.92) were nearly
317 identical to those that did (mean=1.82; Welch's $t(522.96)=0.48$, $p=.63$). The best conclusion is that
318 there is minimal evidence here that foreign funding, *per se*, is associated with erosion of liberal
319 democratic norms around campus speech.

320 **Research Question 2: Is Receipt of Section 117 Funding from OIC Member Countries Related**
321 **to Campus Erosion of Liberal Democratic Norms Around Speech?**

322 The next analysis examined whether norms around speech were different, depending on whether the
323 source of Section 117 funding was from a source in an OIC member country or not. Therefore, we
324 compared attempts to sanction scholars and deplatforming attempts at institutions that received
325 funding from a source in an OIC member country to those that received funding from sources in any
326 other foreign country. There were, on average, more attempts to sanction scholars at institutions that
327 received funding from OIC member countries (mean=2.60) than at institutions that received funding
328 from other foreign sources (mean=0.72; Table 4; Welch's $t(252.94)=6.43$, $p<.001$, $d=.52$). Similarly,
329 there were more deplatforming attempts at institutions that received funding from OIC member
330 countries (mean=1.98) than at institutions that received funding from other foreign sources
331 (mean=0.79, Welch's $t(341.45)=3.49$, $p<.001$, $d=.36$). Thus, the answer to Research Question 2 was
332 "yes": receipt of funding from OIC member countries was related to campus erosion of liberal
333 democratic norms around speech.

334 **Research Question 3: Is Receipt of Section 117 Funding from Authoritarian Regimes Related to**
335 **Campus Erosion of Liberal Democratic Norms Around Speech?**

336 The final Study 2 analyses examined whether norms around speech were different, depending on
337 whether the source of Section 117 funding was an authoritarian country or not. Therefore, we
338 compared attempts to sanction scholars and deplatforming attempts at institutions that received
339 funding from a source in an authoritarian country to those that received funding from sources in any
340 other foreign country. There were, on average, more attempts to sanction scholars at institutions that
341 received funding from authoritarian regimes (mean=2.24) than at institutions that received funding
342 from other foreign sources (mean=0.80, Welch's $t(343.95)=5.24$, $p<.001$, $d=.45$). Similarly, there
343 were more deplatforming attempts at institutions that received funding from authoritarian regimes
344 (mean=2.19) than at institutions that received funding from other foreign sources (mean=1.25,
345 Welch's $t(265.66)=2.65$, $p=.008$, $d=.23$). Thus, the answer to Research Question 3 was "yes": receipt
346 of funding from the most authoritarian sources was related to campus erosion of liberal democratic
347 norms around speech.

348 Receipt of foreign funding, overall, was largely unrelated to erosion of liberal democratic norms
349 around speech and academic freedom, as measured by FIRE's Scholars Under Fire and Campus
350 Deplatforming databases. However, receipt of funding from either OIC member countries or
351 authoritarian countries was related to such erosion.

352 There are, however, several important limitations and qualifications to this study. First, we have no
353 evidence on why these relationships exist. Put differently, we have no information about the social,
354 organizational, economic, or political processes by which these relationships come about. The main

355 contribution of Study 2 is discovering that these relationships exist; but understanding how and why
356 they come about is a question for future research.

357 **6 Study 3: Survey on Relation of Section 117 Funding to Student Perceptions of** 358 **Antisemitism**

359 Because of the well-established relationships between authoritarianism and antisemitism, and because
360 of the ongoing conflict between Israel and many of its Islamic neighbors, one purpose of the present
361 project was to examine whether receipt of Section 117 funding from foreign countries correlates with
362 antisemitism. Because so much Section 117 funding was provided by OIC member countries and
363 other authoritarian countries (see Tables 1, S1, S3 and S4), we performed a series of studies
364 examining this issue using a variety of methodologies. Study 3 was a preliminary examination into
365 whether such funding was associated with campus antisemitism. We conducted a survey of college
366 students at institutions that did and did not receive Section 117 funding. In the survey, we assessed
367 student experiences with antisemitism on campus, and then analyzed whether Section 117 funding
368 was associated with students' reported experiences with antisemitism.

369 **6.1 Methods**

370 **6.1.1 Sample**

371 A national survey of college students was conducted via Prolific. 1928 students nationwide were
372 asked about their experience with antisemitism at their institutions. Demographic data was collected
373 by self-report. 1425 indicated they are women, 490 men, and 13 preferred not to respond. 1298
374 reported that they are White, 244 Asian, 121 Black, 173 mixed, and 92 Other. After removal of all
375 respondents who did not complete the survey, did not provide the name of their institutions, or took
376 over 30 minutes to complete the survey, the final sample was based on 1760 respondents.

377 **6.1.2 Measures**

378 After answering filler questions (such as participants' views of the campus climate), respondents
379 were prompted to answer five questions about their experiences with antisemitism and anti-Zionism
380 on campus. Specifically, participants were asked:

381 How frequently is the following sentiment expressed at your university campus or in your
382 classes? (1=never; 2=rarely; 3=sometimes; 4=often)

- 383 1. Saying Israel has no right to exist as a Jewish country.
- 384 2. Saying that the U.S. government only supports Israel because of Jewish money.
- 385 3. Drawing comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and that of the Nazis.
- 386 4. Saying American Jews care more about Israel than the U.S.
- 387 5. Boycotting Jewish organizations because they have a connection to Israel.

388 These specific questions were utilized because they tap into well-documented antisemitic and anti-
389 Zionist tropes (e.g., ADL, 2023; Burley, 2019; Jussim et al., 2023; Kaufman et al., 2021; Sunshine,
390 2019; Tabarovsky, 2022).

391 6.2 Results and Discussion

392 Table 6 summarizes results of Welch's t-tests comparing experiences of campus antisemitism
393 reported by students attending universities that received Section 117 funds between 2014-2019
394 (n=473) with such experiences reported by students from universities that did not receive Section 117
395 funds (n=1287). First, the overall mean levels of reported exposure to antisemitic and anti-Zionist
396 tropes were low; all means were below 1.4 on a scale of 1-4, where 1 was "never." Consistent with
397 this, the effect sizes are uniformly small. Second, even though overall reported exposure was low,
398 students at colleges/universities that received Section 117 funding reported experiencing all five
399 types of antisemitism more often, in terms of mean differences, than did students at institutions that
400 did not receive Section 117 funding. However, only two had p-values below .01 (Israel has no right
401 to exist; boycott), and a third (American Jews care more about Israel) had a p-value of .015. The
402 remaining items did not approach statistical significance (see Table 6).

403 Additional analyses assessed whether experiences with antisemitism differed depending on whether
404 funding was from OIC vs. non-OIC countries, and whether funding was from authoritarian vs. non-
405 authoritarian countries. However, all of these differences were trivial in magnitude, and none had p-
406 values below .05 (all Welch's t's < 1.0, all p's ≥ .30). Overall, therefore, Study 3 provided modest
407 evidence of students reporting more exposure to antisemitic and anti-Zionist tropes if they attended
408 an institution that received Section 117 funding than if they attended one that did not.

409 A limitation of Study 3 was that it assessed students' self-reported exposure to antisemitic and anti-
410 Zionist rhetoric. Exposure to rhetoric and being a victim of an actual hate crime or some form of
411 harassment or vandalism are very different types of phenomena. Study 5 examined these issues.
412 However, before studying whether receipt of Section 117 funding was related to actual antisemitic
413 incidents, Study 4 assessed whether different national measures of antisemitic incidents assessed
414 similar or fundamentally different underlying phenomena.

415 7 Study 4: Validation of National Measures of Antisemitism

416 To study the relationship between Section 117 funding and antisemitic and anti-Zionist incidents, we
417 needed to first identify credible assessments of such incidents. Several organizations provide
418 assessments of antisemitic incidents, each using different definitions for what classifies as
419 antisemitism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides a national assessment of hate
420 crimes, including those against Jews. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) provides a national
421 assessment of antisemitic incidents, which includes propaganda campaigns and attacks. AMCHA is
422 an American nonprofit that describes itself as "dedicated to investigating, documenting, educating
423 about, and combating antisemitism at institutions of higher education in America" (AMCHA
424 Initiative, n.d.-b). Its activities include monitoring antisemitic and anti-Zionist activities on college
425 and university campuses. The main purpose of Study 4 was to assess the concurrent validity of these
426 three sources with each other (Table S5 reports summary statistics regarding reports of antisemitism
427 from ADL, FBI, and AMCHA).

428 Each of these sources of data on antisemitism has limitations. AMCHA, for instance, has faced
429 criticism for cataloging BDS activity as antisemitic, because some interpret it as human rights
430 activity. But AMCHA data also includes overt expressions of antisemitism on campus such as
431 swastikas and anti-Jewish slurs, and incidents of students targeted in the classroom for being Jewish.
432 Thus, we describe AMCHA variables as measuring antisemitism/anti-Zionism. The ADL's

433 antisemitic incident reports include a variety of incidents including slurs, the display of hate symbols,
434 and violent attacks, but it may lack the same reach as law enforcement-reported incidents,
435 particularly in lower-population areas. And even the FBI may underreport hate crimes. Nonetheless,
436 if all three sources produce similar estimates, it is likely that they are capturing bona fide variation in
437 antisemitism over time and place.

438 Thus, Study 4 examined two alternative hypotheses:

439 **Hypothesis 1:** The FBI, ADL, and AMCHA data capture underlying, similar, and systematic
440 variability in acts of antisemitism/anti-Zionism. As such, there should be considerable similarity
441 among these three measures. Therefore, the three reports should substantially correlate with one
442 another.

443 **Hypothesis 2:** The FBI, ADL, and AMCHA reports of antisemitism are so different from one another
444 that they do not capture fundamentally similar phenomena. Therefore, there will be little or no
445 correlation among them.

446 7.1 Methods

447 We obtained data on antisemitic acts and incidents from the websites of the FBI, ADL, and AMCHA
448 for 2015-2020. Our first objective was to assess the consistency among their reports. Data on
449 antisemitic activity in 3,108 U.S. counties in the lower 48 states was obtained from the FBI's
450 Uniform Crime Reporting database for the years 2015-2020. We linked the AMCHA data on campus
451 antisemitism to county by using Google map data for campuses. The ADL Tracker™ dataset contains
452 data on antisemitic incidents for all 50 states. The ADL, AMCHA and FBI spreadsheets were
453 converted from city form to county FIPS code using INDEX and MATCH functions in Excel with an
454 extensive dataset of 108,797 cities and towns downloaded from SimpleMaps.com. Cities not included
455 in that dataset were manually matched to county FIPS code. Incidents reported on university
456 campuses were referenced to their respective counties. A small number of townships, villages, and
457 towns could not be located, likely due to reporting errors, and were thus excluded.

458 7.2 Results and Discussion

459 The main analyses tested our hypotheses suggesting that the three measures of antisemitism either
460 will (Hypothesis 1) or will not (Hypothesis 2) substantially correlate with one another. We did this by
461 assessing the Spearman correlation between the three measures by county. For this analysis, the three
462 AMCHA variables were summed to create an overall index of AMCHA incidents.

463 We used Spearman correlations because the data were not normally distributed; most counties had no
464 antisemitic incidents. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the three measures correlated substantially
465 (Spearman correlations: $r(3106) = .56$ (FBI with ADL); $r(3106) = .53$ (ADL with AMCHA); and
466 $r(3106) = .48$ (FBI with AMCHA); all p 's < .001).

467 Figure 1 shows three maps of the United States, each colored by the percentile of the count of
468 antisemitic incidents occurring in each county per the titled dataset. The maps reflect: 1. The different
469 overall levels of antisemitism reported by the three sources; and 2. The geographic similarity in the
470 patterns of antisemitism each source reports. The first map shows the percentile rankings of counties
471 based on the Targeting variable reported by the AMCHA Initiative (because it is most similar to the
472 ADL and FBI data), while the second map displays the FBI's reported antisemitic hate crimes, and

473 the third map represents the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reports of antisemitic incidents. Each
474 county's color intensity corresponds to its relative percentile ranking, with darker shades indicating
475 higher frequencies or reports of antisemitic incidents.

476 The maps provide a geographical perspective on the prevalence and distribution of antisemitism at
477 the county level, aiding in understanding regional patterns and differences. They are also a way to
478 visualize the overlap or similarity among the three measures of antisemitism and are, therefore,
479 another way to examine our alternative hypotheses. Taken together, the visual perspective of the
480 maps and the correlations among the three data sources all support Hypothesis 1 and indicate that
481 there exists substantial alignment on county-level antisemitism measures. Therefore, Studies 5, 6, and
482 7 use the data from the FBI, ADL, and AMCHA on antisemitism.

483 **8 Study 5: Association of Section 117 Funding with Antisemitic and Anti-Zionist Activity**

484 Study 5 assessed the relationship between receipt of Section 117 funding and antisemitism/anti-
485 Zionism. Some of the largest contributors of Section 117 funding of institutions of higher education
486 were from OIC member countries. There is a long history of hostility to Jews within violent Islamic
487 extremism and Islamism more broadly (see Schroeter, 2018; Tausch, 2014 for reviews). Similarly,
488 authoritarian regimes on the right (e.g., Nazi Germany) and left (e.g., Soviet Union) promulgated
489 antisemitic rhetoric and enacted antisemitic policies. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to
490 explore whether funding from OIC member countries and/or authoritarian countries was associated
491 with antisemitism on campuses. Three research questions were assessed:

492 Were there higher levels of antisemitism at:

- 493 1. institutions that received Section 117 funding than at institutions that did not receive Section
494 117 funding?
- 495 2. institutions that received Section 117 funding from OIC member countries than at institutions
496 that received Section 117 funding from non-OIC member countries?
- 497 3. institutions that received Section 117 funding from authoritarian countries than at institutions
498 that received Section 117 funding from non-authoritarian countries?

499 **8.1 Methods**

500 **8.1.1 Institutions**

501 We used the U.S. News & World Report (2022; Reiter, n.d.) list of top 100 universities and top 100
502 colleges in the U.S. as our sample (plus ties, total N=203). See Table S6 for the list of colleges and
503 universities included in our analysis. This list includes some of the most important and influential
504 institutions in the country, and it was created independent of the present research, thereby minimizing
505 the potential for selection bias. Of this set of 203 institutions, 107 received Section 117 funding.

506 **8.1.2 Linking Institutions to Antisemitism**

507 Analyses were based on antisemitic/anti-Zionist incidents (total N=2040) as reported by AMCHA
508 (AMCHA Initiative, n.d.-a;) at 107 institutions over six years, from 2015-2020. We used these with a
509 one-year lag in order to permit diffusion of effects for receipt of Section 117 funding from 2014-
510 2019. The three types of AMCHA incidents analyzed were BDS, Antisemitic Expression, and

511 Targeting (as previously described in **Data Sources and Aggregation**) as well as the summed Total
512 of all three. AMCHA reports antisemitic/anti-Zionist incidents on campus, something done by neither
513 the FBI nor ADL. Therefore, these analyses only involved AMCHA data.

514 **8.2 Results and Discussion**

515 We examined whether levels of each of the three AMCHA types of incidents varied depending on the
516 receipt or source of Section 117 funding received from 2014-2019 (see Table S2, S3 and S4).

517 **Research Question 1: Are there higher levels of antisemitism/anti-Zionism at institutions that** 518 **received Section 117 funding than at institutions that did not?**

519 Four Welch's t-tests compared levels of BDS, Expression, Targeting and their summed total among
520 institutions that either received or did not receive Section 117 funding. Table 7 reports the results. All
521 three measures and the total were higher among institutions that received Section 117 funding (all
522 p 's<.001). Furthermore, the effect sizes were strong ($.52 \leq$ Cohen's d 's $\leq .74$).

523 **Research Question 2: Are there higher levels of antisemitism/anti-Zionism at institutions that**
524 **received Section 117 funding from OIC member countries than at institutions that received**
525 **Section 117 funding from other countries?** Four Welch's t-tests compared levels of BDS,
526 Expression, Targeting and their summed Total, but this time, among institutions that received Section
527 117 funding from either OIC or other countries. Table 8 reports the results. These results were also
528 strong and consistent. All three measures of antisemitism/anti-Zionism, and the total, were much
529 higher among institutions that received OIC funding (all p 's<.001, all d 's $\geq .59$; see Table 8).

530 **Research Question 3: Are there higher levels of antisemitism/anti-Zionism at institutions that**
531 **received Section 117 funding from authoritarian countries than institutions that received**
532 **Section 117 funding from non-authoritarian countries?** Four Welch's t-tests compared levels of
533 BDS, Expression, Targeting and their summed total, but this time, among institutions that received
534 Section 117 funding from either authoritarian countries or other countries. Table 9 reports the results,
535 which were also strong and consistent. All three measures of antisemitism/anti-Zionism, and the total,
536 were much higher among institutions that received funding from authoritarian countries than from
537 other countries (all p 's<.001, all d 's $\geq .55$; see Table 9).

538 Overall, therefore, Study 5 produced strong evidence that receipt of Section 117 funding *per se* is
539 associated with heightened antisemitic/anti-Zionist activity. It also produced consistently strong
540 evidence that institutions that received Section 117 funding from OIC member countries or
541 authoritarian countries had much higher levels of antisemitic/anti-Zionist activity.

542 **Study 6: Does What Happens on Campus Stay on Campus?**

543 Having demonstrated a robust association between receipt of Section 117 funds with antisemitic
544 activity on campus, we next examined whether and how antisemitic activity on campus correlated
545 with broader area trends in antisemitic activity. College and university campuses are often leading
546 indicators of cultural trends (Altbach, 2007), though they are also not necessarily immune to being
547 influenced by those trends. Therefore, it is possible that antisemitic political activity, protests, and
548 even violence on college campuses could be related to such events in the wider society. Study 6,
549 therefore, examined whether campus antisemitism is associated with county-level incidents.

550 9.1 Methods

551 This study examined whether there were relationships between AMCHA data on campus
 552 antisemitism/anti-Zionism and ADL and FBI data on county antisemitism, using a county-level
 553 dataset. The dataset included 3,108 counties within the contiguous United States. For this analysis,
 554 we used AMCHA Targeting (rather than AMCHA BDS or Expression) due to its similarity in kind to
 555 ADL-recorded incidents of antisemitism and FBI-reported hate crimes. County demographic data
 556 was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau's (2017) American Community Survey. These data were
 557 then merged with a TigerLine county shapefile after removing states and territories outside of the
 558 lower-48 states using FIPS codes.

559 9.2 Results and Discussion

560 9.2.1 Analysis Overview

561 Analyses assessed the relationship between the AMCHA data on campus antisemitism (summarized
 562 in Table S5, and which occurred on 402 campuses in the U.S.) and antisemitism (as indicated by
 563 ADL and FBI data) in both the county in which those campuses were located and in adjacent
 564 counties. Geospatial regression models, an adaptation of OLS regression, were used to examine those
 565 associations. Whereas OLS regression is typically used to assess relationships among different
 566 variables, one common use of geospatial regression is to assess patterns of association between one
 567 or more variables in different locations. For example, geospatial regression might be used to assess
 568 the relationship of unemployment levels in one area to home foreclosures in surrounding areas (see,
 569 e.g., Berry et al., 2008 for an overview).

570 The first step to spatial analysis is to assess the presence of spatial autocorrelation, or clustering. A
 571 preferred method for assessing the existence of clustering is the Moran's I test:

$$I = \frac{n}{S_0} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} z_i z_j}{\sum_{i=1}^n z_i^2}$$

572
 573 i and j are features, n is the total number of features, w is the spatial weight for features i and j , and z
 574 is the deviation of a given attribute from the mean for i or j . S_0 indicates the combination of all spatial
 575 weights (Gimond, 2023).

576 We performed our Moran's I test using Monte Carlo simulations ($n=999$) of randomly distributed
 577 spatial arrangements in order to test whether our variables were randomly distributed, evenly
 578 dispersed, or clustered, and found that they were clustered ($p<.001$; Bivand, 2022). Given the spatial
 579 autocorrelation in our dataset, we ran Lagrange Multiplier tests on linear models to address
 580 appropriate spatial techniques.

$$581 \quad y = X\beta + \rho W(1)y + u$$

$$582 \quad u = \lambda W(2)u + e$$

583 W is a spatial weights matrix, e is an uncorrelated error term, λ is a spatial error, and ρ is a spatial
 584 lag. The dual tests examine the presence of a missing spatial error ($\lambda=0$) or spatial lag term ($\rho=0$;
 585 Anselin et al., 1996). Lagrange Multiplier tests indicated that our data would most support spatial lag
 586 models, while spatial error models proved less significant.

587 Hence, we used spatial simultaneous autocorrelation linear lag models, which analyze the
 588 correlations between the independent variables in neighboring areas, to assess the relationship of
 589 campus antisemitism to antisemitism in surrounding counties based on the following model:

$$590 \quad y = \rho W y + \beta X + \varepsilon$$

591 y is the dependent variable (FBI or ADL data), x is the independent variable (AMCHA and
 592 population in county), ρ is the scalar parameter (which describes the magnitude of spatial dependence
 593 between the observed variables), and W is the spatial weights matrix (which quantifies the spatial
 594 relationship between geographically contiguous observations; LeSage & Pace, 2009).

595 **9.3 Main Findings**

596 Table 10 presents the main results from two geospatial models, one for each outcome (county level
 597 antisemitism as reported by the FBI and ADL). Each model has two predictors (AMCHA Targeting,
 598 county population) of county level incidents of antisemitism. All coefficients are unstandardized and
 599 reported as β .

600 The critical result in Table 10 is the row for antisemitic targeting (AMCHA) on campus, which was
 601 associated with all four antisemitism outcomes. The higher the antisemitism on campus, the higher
 602 the levels of antisemitism in the county in which that campus was located (ADL: $\beta=2.9522$, $p<.0001$;
 603 FBI: $\beta=4.3483$, $p<.0001$). Campus antisemitism also was associated with antisemitism in the
 604 immediately adjacent counties (ADL: $\beta=1.59$, $p<.0001$; FBI: $\beta=5.7319$, $p<.0001$).

605 These results clearly show that, as campus antisemitism goes up or down, so does antisemitism in the
 606 surrounding communities. Although Study 6 has established the existence of this relationship, it
 607 raises more questions than it answers. Why and how does this connection between campus and
 608 community antisemitism occur? Are the antisemitic events near campus perpetrated by students?
 609 Does hostility to Jews spread from campus to surrounding communities? Alternatively, do
 610 communities that harbor more antisemitism provide more support and encouragement for campus
 611 antisemitism than communities that are less antisemitic? Do certain types of major local, national or
 612 international controversies trigger simultaneous spikes in antisemitism on campus and in the
 613 surrounding communities? Or is something else entirely going on? These are all questions for future
 614 research.

615 **10 Study 7: Antisemitism from Campus to the Rest of the Country**

616 Study 6 found that antisemitic incidents on campus are associated with incidents in surrounding
 617 counties. However, those analyses did not examine the relationship between antisemitism on campus
 618 and antisemitic incidents in the rest of the country. Doing so was the purpose of Study 7.

619 **10.1 Method**

620 Study 7 examined the relationship between campus antisemitism (AMCHA data, 2015-2020) and
621 antisemitic hate crimes in the U.S. as reported by the FBI from 2015-2020. Because Study 7 focuses
622 on antisemitism per se, it did not include analyses with AMCHA's BDS data. Table S5 summarizes
623 the data on antisemitism and hate crimes against Jews. The FBI and AMCHA data were integrated
624 into a daily time series table using INDEX and MATCH functions in Excel. ADL data were not used
625 in these analyses because they are not available by year for 2015-2020.

626 **10.2 Results and Discussion**

627 Analyses examined whether variability in campus antisemitism forecasts variability in antisemitism
628 in the U.S. Figure 2 visually displays the variability and covariability among FBI antisemitic hate
629 crimes and antisemitic incidents on campus. Spikes in green or blue (AMCHA campus antisemitism)
630 often precede spikes in FBI reported antisemitic hate crimes (red).

631 To test this pattern more rigorously, we employed Granger causality analysis. Granger causality is a
632 statistical time-series correlation analysis which includes lagged variables to determine whether one
633 is useful in forecasting the other. This assesses whether lagged values of the explanatory variable
634 better predict the dependent variable than the latter's lagged values alone (Stern, 2019).

635 Granger causality has some important limitations. The term "Granger causality" is something of a
636 misnomer because forecasting is not equivalent to causality and the results of a Granger causality
637 analysis rarely prove causality (Shojaie & Fox, 2022). In addition, effects sizes are not produced by
638 Granger causality analyses. Despite its limitations, Shojaie & Fox (2022, p. 314) conclude that: "At
639 minimum, ...continued developments in this area can help researchers take the first step toward
640 causal inference by restricting the set of possible causal hypotheses." See Table S7 for fit measures.

641 The key Granger causality results are shown in Table 11. Both Campus Targeting Incidents
642 ($p < .0001$) and Campus Antisemitic Expression ($p = .0257$) forecasted FBI-reported hate crimes.
643 However, the p -value above .01 should be viewed as an invitation to future research rather than as
644 definitive. The Granger causality results also found that national FBI hate crimes forecast Campus
645 Antisemitic Targeting incidents ($p = .0039$), but a statistically significant forecast was not found for
646 Campus Antisemitic Expression ($p = .159$).

647 These findings are exploratory and correlational, meaning that causal conclusions are not justified,
648 and further research is necessary. Nonetheless, the Granger causality analyses indicated that both
649 campus antisemitic targeting and FBI hate crimes nationwide forecast one another. Speculation
650 regarding hypotheses worthy of further testing are, therefore, warranted. For example, one possible
651 explanation for these relationships is that institutional antisemitism could spill out to national
652 incidents and hate crimes. Another is that heightened antisemitism around the country could manifest
653 on campus.

654 The strongest and clearest results indicate bidirectional predictive power between Campus
655 Antisemitic Targeting Incidents and FBI hate crimes, whereas relationships with Campus Antisemitic
656 Expression were weaker. We speculate that this pattern occurs because like targeted antisemitic
657 harassment, hate crimes (other than property-related crimes) target a specific person or people. Also,
658 antisemitism directed at specific targets is more severe than is un-targeted expression. Harassment,
659 bullying, or hate crimes (targeting) are clearly more severe transgressions than antisemitic or anti-

660 Zionist posters or chants (expression), which is why targeting is potentially punishable either by legal
661 or campus authorities whereas expression rarely is (a notable exception is when it constitutes
662 vandalism or other property-related crimes). As such, targeting may be more likely to make campus,
663 local, or even national news stories. If so, this might be more likely to inspire similar such actions in
664 other places. Regardless of the explanation, however, our findings indicate that campus institutional
665 antisemitism does not remain isolated to the university but is related to broader regional activity.

666 **11 General Discussion**

667 In this report, we explored ways in which Section 117 funding received by colleges and universities
668 predicted both the erosion of liberal democratic norms around speech and antisemitism. Key findings
669 include:

- 670 1. Major institutions of higher learning in the U.S. received billions of dollars of Section 117
671 funding from foreign sources between 2014 and 2019 (Study 1).
- 672 2. Receipt of Section 117 funding:
 - 673 a. was weakly related to an illiberal environment on campus in which scholars and
674 campus speakers were likely to be targeted for disinvitation or punishment by activist
675 campaigns (Study 2).
 - 676 b. was weakly associated with student reports of campus exposure to both antisemitic
677 and anti-Zionist rhetoric (Study 3).
 - 678 c. was strongly associated with higher levels of antisemitic acts than on campuses that
679 did not receive such funding (Study 5).
- 680 3. Receipt of funding from member countries of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
681 and from authoritarian countries was:
 - 682 a. strongly associated with scholars and campus speakers being targeted for disinvitation
683 or punishment by activist campaigns (Study 2).
 - 684 b. weakly related to student reports of their experiences with antisemitic and anti-Zionist
685 rhetoric (Study 3).
 - 686 c. strongly associated with higher levels of antisemitic activity on campus than on
687 campuses that did not receive funding from such countries (Study 5).
- 688 4. Increased antisemitic activity on college campuses was associated with heightened antisemitic
689 activity in nearby communities (Study 6).
- 690 5. Campus antisemitism directed at specific targets was associated with the level of national
691 antisemitic hate crimes (Study 7).

692 **11.1 Limitations and Directions for Future Research**

693 As the first large-scale and data-driven report that links foreign funding, democratic norms and
694 antisemitism, this work has notable limitations. Because our analyses were correlational, we did not
695 reach causal conclusions. This leaves unanswered many important questions. For example, does

696 receipt of foreign funding, especially from member countries of the Organisation for Islamic
697 Cooperation or from authoritarian countries, increase antisemitism, illiberalism or the erosion of
698 specific liberal democratic norms on campus such as those regarding free speech? Or perhaps the
699 independent development of illiberalism and antisemitism attracted such funding. Does some third
700 variable (such as university status, number of state-sponsored students from anti-democratic
701 countries, number of antisemitic faculty, whether the university president is an antisemite, etc.) cause
702 illiberalism and attract foreign funding from illiberal sources? Do spikes in campus antisemitism
703 cause spikes in surrounding communities and the country? Do spikes in local or national antisemitism
704 cause spikes in campus antisemitism? Or does some combination of causes combine in complex
705 ways?

706 This research provided no insight into how any of the potential directions of causality might occur.
707 Perhaps Section 117 money funds illiberal or antisemitic groups on campus. Perhaps it supports
708 hiring illiberal or antisemitic professors. Perhaps this sort of support provides tacit endorsement of
709 antisemitic incidents. Alternatively, campus sociopolitical trends conducive to illiberalism and
710 antisemitism may have developed independently of Section 117 funding, and Section 117 funding
711 may have no causal relationship whatsoever with campus illiberalism or antisemitism.

712 Another limitation stems from the exploratory nature of all studies reported herein. Our analyses cast
713 a broad net, operationalizing “authoritarian sources” as the 30 most authoritarian countries plus
714 Russia. Separately, for OIC countries, most were ranked as authoritarian or “hybrid” (a mix of
715 democratic and authoritarian) by the Democracy Index, and many have populations with high levels
716 of antizionist and antisemitic beliefs and attitudes. One could test these hypotheses using different
717 operationalizations of authoritarianism and antisemitic/antizionist attitudes. We did not do this
718 because it could have muddied the findings, due to overlap between various alternative
719 operationalizations. Additionally, different operationalizations would have created a massive multiple
720 comparisons problem requiring a dramatic reduction of our already-reduced threshold for statistical
721 significance. Although, the consistent differences found between these and other countries validates
722 how we grouped them, it is nonetheless possible that those differences derive primarily from specific
723 subsets of those countries we grouped. Addressing these sorts of issues is an important issue for
724 future research.

725 Future research should test potential causal explanations. Whereas experimental research, which
726 would permit strong causal conclusions, is probably not possible in this area, identifying causal
727 directions is an important area for future research. Causal hypotheses could be tested in future non-
728 experimental research that might justify causal conclusions, as long as certain strong standards are
729 met (Rohrer, 2018). Although the present research does not meet those standards, it does raise
730 important causal questions.

731 Additionally, the present research did not assess why some of this funding went unreported for years,
732 until the U.S. Department of Education conducted an investigation in 2019. Therefore, the present
733 research did not examine whether this occurred because of innocent mistakes, managerial
734 incompetence, overly complex bureaucratic reporting requirements, political agendas, corruption, or
735 some combination of reasons. It is also possible that foreign funding went unreported for different
736 reasons at different institutions. The purpose of the present research was to investigate social and
737 political phenomena related to receipt of Section 117 funding; its purpose was not to investigate how
738 or why the money went unreported.

739 Last, this was the first quantitative investigation (of which we are aware) on how receipt of Section
740 117 funds relates to campus liberal democratic norms. As such, it was exploratory, rather than
741 confirmatory. Therefore, all findings should be viewed as preliminary, pending replication in future
742 research.

743 **11.2 No Conspiracies Needed**

744 It is important not to misunderstand or misrepresent the findings in the present paper. Many elements
745 of the findings may appear ripe for conspiratorial thinking – secrecy (undisclosed funding), wealthy
746 and powerful foreign actors, and harmful outcomes (e.g., spreading antisemitism and undermining
747 liberal norms). Nothing presented here suggests that mustachio-twirling villains from authoritarian or
748 majority Muslim countries are conspiring in dark basements with deans and provosts to corrode
749 democracy or harm Jews. We caution against misconstruing these findings to blame and target
750 students or faculty who simply have ties to these donor countries. Indeed, we have no evidence that
751 any of the relationships we uncovered reflect causal effects of foreign funding. Causal effects are one
752 possible explanation for our findings, but, as we have pointed out throughout the manuscript,
753 causality may flow in very different directions. Moreover, even if the influence of foreign funding is
754 ultimately found to be causal in subsequent research, it would likely happen through very
755 conventional processes (e.g., attracting or supporting scholars or organizations with particular views
756 or political agendas) rather than through conspiracies concocted in dark corners.

757 **12 Conclusion**

758 Despite the preliminary and correlational nature of this report, it raises some sobering possibilities
759 that deserve attention in future research. Are international actors funneling large amounts of money,
760 sometimes undisclosed, into higher education (including elite institutions that often have outsized
761 influence on American culture and politics) for purposes harmful to the democratic norms of
762 pluralism, tolerance, and freedom of speech? There clearly has been an erosion of democratic norms
763 regarding freedom of speech in academia (Clark et al., 2023; Lukianoff & Schlott, 2023; Maranto et
764 al., in press). These developments are surely complex and multiply determined.

765 The present research highlights two troubling possibilities that deserve further investigation. The first
766 is that receipt of Section 117 funding from foreign sources, especially authoritarian ones, has
767 contributed to these developments. The second is that providing massive financial support to
768 campuses with ascendant illiberalism serves the interests of foreign actors hostile to the U.S. in
769 particular or liberal democracy in general.

770

771

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Tables

Table 1A (Study 1). Countries providing the highest levels of Section 117 funding to U.S. institutions of higher education, 2014-2019. (Values are those disclosed as of September 23, 2020.)	
<u>Country</u>	<u>Funds</u>
QATAR	\$2,759,117,918
ENGLAND	\$1,577,403,642
CHINA	\$1,410,474,414
SAUDI ARABIA	\$1,153,538,983
CANADA	\$968,332,447
BERMUDA	\$901,571,209
HONG KONG	\$890,207,065
JAPAN	\$772,096,600
SWITZERLAND	\$705,088,310
INDIA	\$554,312,819

Table 1B (Study 1). U.S. institutions of higher education receiving the highest levels of Section 117 funding, 2014-2019. (Values are those disclosed as of September 23, 2020.)	
<u>University</u>	<u>Funds</u>
Carnegie Mellon University	\$1,481,725,103
Cornell University	\$1,293,631,296
Harvard University	\$966,469,171
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	\$862,140,274
Yale University	\$613,441,311
Texas A&M University	\$548,993,574
Johns Hopkins University	\$509,681,796
Georgetown University	\$416,024,356
Northwestern University	\$413,224,081
University of Colorado Boulder	\$402,848,865

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Table 2 (Study 2). FIRE Data by Year.										
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Scholars Under Fire	31	46	50	86	88	90	161	223	151	60
Deplatforming attempts	70	58	83	95	72	91	44	48	80	130

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Table 3 (Study 2). Foreign Funding: Received versus Did Not. The means refer to the average number of Scholars Under Fire or deplatforming attempts per institution.

Source of Funding:	Scholars Under Fire	Deplatforming Attempts
Received Section 117 Funding: Mean (SD), N	1.82 (3.26), 349	1.90 (3.57), 349
Did Not Receive Section 117 Funding, Mean (SD), N	1.37 (0.92), 254	1.82 (1.88), 361
Welch's t, df	2.44, 418.70	0.40, 520.09
p-value	.0151	.6917
Effect Size (Cohen's d)	0.15	0.03

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Table 4 (Study 2). Funding Source: OIC Member Countries versus Other Countries. The means refer to the average number of Scholars Under Fire or deplatforming attempts per institution.

Source of Funding:	Scholars Under Fire	Deplatforming Attempts
Received Funding from OIC Member Countries: Mean (SD), N	2.56 (3.92), 210	2.35 (3.82), 210
Received Foreign Funding But Not From OIC Member Countries: Mean (SD), N	0.71 (1.22), 139	1.23 (3.06), 139
Welch's t, df	6.42, 263.39	3.02, 330.47
p-value	<.0001	.00269
Effect Size (Cohen's d)	0.52	0.31

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Table 5 (Study 2). Funding Source: Authoritarian Countries versus Other Countries. The means refer to the average number of Scholars Under Fire or deplatforming attempts per institution.

Source of Funding:	Scholars Under Fire	Deplatforming Attempts
Received Funding From Authoritarian Countries: Mean (SD), N	2.23 (3.67), 249	2.16 (3.86), 249
Received Funding, But Not From Authoritarian Countries: Mean (SD), N	0.80 (1.46), 100	1.26 (2.62), 100
Welch's t, df	5.22, 343.04	2.51, 262.25
p-value	<.0001	.0125
Effect Size (Cohen's d)	0.45	0.22

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Table 6 (Study 3). Students' reported experiences with antisemitic claims at institutions that received Section 117 funding compared to those that did not (2014-2019). Responses ranged from 1 (never) to 4 (often).

Outcome:	Received Section 117 Funding Mean (SD), N=473	Did Not Receive Section 117 Funding Mean (SD), N=1287	Welch's t(df), p-value	Effect size (d)
Israel has no right to exist	1.39 (.96)	1.24 (.96)	t(700.7)= -4.10, p<.001	d = .15
U.S. supports Israel because of Jewish money	1.22 (.76)	1.19 (.76)	t(771.6)= -1.12, p=.261	d = .04
Israelis compared to Nazis	1.22 (.74)	1.21 (.74)	t(857.7)= -0.62, p=.537	d = .02
American Jews care more about Israel than the U.S.	1.26 (.78)	1.19 (.78)	t(740.1)= -2.44, p=.015	d = .09
Boycott Jewish organizations	1.33 (.93)	1.23 (.93)	t(718.8)= -2.77, p=.006	d = .10

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Table 7 (Study 5). Welch's t-tests comparing antisemitism variables among institutions that received Section 117 foreign funding to those that did not. Means are the average number of each type of incident.

Antisemitism Measure	BDS	Expression	Targeting	Total
Received Section 117 Funding: Mean (SD), N=107	3.64 (6.03)	9.97 (13.45)	6.77 (8.18)	20.38 (24.43)
Did Not Receive Section 117 Funding, Mean (SD), N=96	0.67 (2.21)	1.35 (4.29)	1.24 (3.17)	3.26 (8.59)
T-Statistic, df	4.76, 134.07	6.28, 127.11	6.47, 137.51	6.80, 131.90
p-value	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
Effect Size (Cohen's d)	0.52	0.67	0.72	0.74

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Table 8 (Study 5). Welch's t-tests comparing antisemitism variables among institutions that received funding from OIC member countries to those that received funding from other countries. Means are the average number of each type of incident.

Antisemitism Measure	BDS	Expression	Targeting	Total
Received Funding From OIC Member Countries: Mean (SD), N=75	4.27 (6.53)	11.69 (14.91)	7.77 (9.00)	23.73 (26.79)
Received Foreign Funding But Not From OIC Member Countries, Mean (SD), N=32	0.59 (1.19)	2.47 (4.13)	1.94 (3.22)	5.00 (7.49)
T-Statistic, df	4.69, 82.41	4.93, 92.82	4.92, 99.57	5.57, 93.10
p-value	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
Effect Size (Cohen's d)	0.59	0.68	0.73	0.77

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Table 9 (Study 5). Welch’s t-tests comparing antisemitism variables among institutions that received funding from authoritarian countries to those that did not. Means are the average number of each type of incident.

Antisemitism Measure	BDS	Expression	Targeting	Total
Received Funding from Authoritarian Countries: Mean (SD), N=80	4.00 (6.41)	11.06 (14.64)	7.34 (8.90)	22.40 (26.46)
Received Funding, But Not From Authoritarian Countries, Mean (SD), N=27	0.70 (1.30)	2.63 (4.46)	2.15 (3.27)	5.48 (7.95)
T-Statistic, df	4.35, 92.50	4.56, 100.85	4.41, 99.94	5.08, 100.73
p-value	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001
Effect Size (Cohen’s d)	0.55	0.64	0.64	0.71

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Table 10 (Study 6). Spatial simultaneous autocorrelation lag model depicting the relationships between campus antisemitic targeting (AMCHA), ADL incidents, and FBI hate crimes by county. Nagelkerke Pseudo R² = .6878, .3765. Coefficients are linear and unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses.

VARIABLES	ADL		FBI	
	Association with County Antisemitism	Association with Antisemitism in Neighboring Counties	Association with County Antisemitism	Association with Antisemitism in Neighboring Counties
Targeting on campus (AMCHA)	2.9522 (.216) p<.0001	1.59 (.1194) p<.0001	4.3483 (.1281) p<.0001	5.7319 (.1395) p<.0001
Population (in millions)	.00002 (.0000008) p<.0001	.00001 (.0000008) p<.0001	.00000003 (.000001) p=.9805	.000000004 (.0000002) p=.9913
Constant	-1.7337 (.216) p<.0001		-.42 (.3127) p<.1792	
Observations	3,100		3,100	
Log Likelihood (for LM)	-11,991.82		-13,107.89	
Akaike Inf. Crit. (for LM)	24,454		26,247	

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Table 11 (Study 7). Granger causality analysis assessing how campus antisemitism and FBI hate crimes against Jews forecast one another (January 2015-December 2020).		
	Causes FBI Reported Hate Crimes Against Jews	Caused by FBI Reported Hate Crimes Against Jews
Campus Antisemitic Targeting Incidents	$p < .0001$	$p = .0039$
Campus Antisemitic Expression	$p = .0257$	$p = .1585$

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Figure Captions

950 Figure 1 (Study 4). Comparative Choropleth Maps of Antisemitic Targeting and Incidents in U.S. Counties,
 951 2015-2020. This set of three maps visualizes the distribution of antisemitic activities across U.S. counties, as
 952 indicated by different data sources. Darker reds indicate a county with more antisemitic incidents.

953 Figure 2 (Study 7). ggplot chart (Wickham, 2016) showing campus antisemitic incidents (both Expression and
 954 Targeting) between 2015 and 2020 (AMCHA data), and FBI antisemitic hate crimes by week. Green reflects
 955 expressions of antisemitism on campus. Blue reflects antisemitic targeting on campus. Red reflects FBI
 956 reported hate crimes.